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RECENT DECISIONS
AnMIRALTY-R:rGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN CERTAIN CASES ON GREAT LAKEsCURE NOT CoNTRAar OR TORT MATrER-Libelant brought
an action for maintenance and cure on the admiralty side of a federal district
court in Illinois. He requested a jury trial, relying on the Act of February 20,
1845, which provides that in certain admiralty and maritime cases arising on
the Great Lakes relating to any matter of contract or tort, trial shall be by jury
on the demand of either party. The trial court heard the case without a jury
and dismissed the libel on the merits. The court of appeals held, on appeal,
that maintenance and cure was a matter of ancient and established maritime
law, and not a matter of contract or tort for which the libelant would be entitled by the statute to a jury trial. Miller v. Standard Oil Co., (7th Cir. 1952)
199 F. (2d) 457, cert. den. 345 U.S. 945, 73 S.Ct. 836 (1953).
Whether a claim for maintenance and cure is contractual, delictual or belongs to some independent category has not been clearly determined.1 Story
saw the claim as part of the contract for compensation of the seaman.2 Though
modem courts occasionally speak of the claim as contractual,3 more often it is
called quasi-contractual,4 or an incident of the status of the seaman,5 or a duty
annexed by law to the employer-employee relationship6 or to the relationship
of the seaman to the vessel.7 By characterizing the claim as relational or quasicontractual the courts are able to use contract principles or ignore them as the
occasion demands to reach a proper result. Thus, it has been held that for surMAfN:r:ENANCE AND

1
2

2 NoRRis, THE LA.w 011 SEAMEN §544 (1952).
Harden v. Gordon, (C.C. Me. 1823) 11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6,047.
3 There appears to be general agreement now that the claim does not sound in tort.
Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., (2d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 449; Pacific Steamship
Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 49 S.Ct. 75 (1928). However, a breach of the duty to
provide maintenance and cure may give rise to a "personal injury'' within the meaning of
the Jones Act. Cortes, Administrator v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 53
S.Ct. 173 (1932).
4 ". • • Implied in law as a contractual obligation. • • ." Pacific Steamship Co. v.
Peterson, note 3 supra, at 138. " ••• the right to maintenance and cure lies on the borderline between 'contract' and 'quasi-contract'••••" Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., note 3
supra, at 452.
5 "In its origin, maintenance and cure must be taken as an incident to the status of the
seaman in the employment of his ship." O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
318 U.S. 36 at 42, 63 S.Ct. 488 (1943).
6 Cardozo characterized the claim to maintenance and cure as follows: "The duty to
make such provision is imposed by the law itself as one annexed to the employment. Contractual it is in the sense that it has its source in a relation which is contractual in origin,
but given the relation, no agreement is competent to abrogate the incident." Cortes, Administrator v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., note 3 supra, at 371. It is interesting to compare
this statement with his view of the duty of the shoreside employer to provide workmen's
compensation for his employees: "The contract creates the relation to which the law
attaches the duty••••" Matter of Smith v. Heine Boiler Co., 224 N.Y. 9 at 12, 119 N.E.
878 (1918). See also Loverich v. Warner Co., (3d Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 690 at 692,
where the claim is characterized as "an inseparable incident to the relation of the parties."
7 "Clearly, the seaman's right ••• is one imposed by law, arising out of the nature of
his employment and his relationship to the vessel." 2 NoRRis, THE LA.w 011 SEAMEN
§544, p. 145 (1952).
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vival purposes, the claim sounds in contract rather than tort and hence survives
the seaman's death. 8 But another court rejected an insurance company's argument that the claim for maintenance and cure was contractual in nature and
hence not within the coverage of a policy which indemnified the sh~powner from
"liability' imposed by law." 9 It has been held that maintenance and cure is
either an implied-in-fact provision in the maritime contract or quasi-contractualimplied in law-so that a municipal court given jurisdiction over contracts
express or implied has jurisdiction over an action for maintenance and cure.10
The decision in the principal case reflects the desire of the court to minimize
the effect of a statute creating an exception to the general rule denying jury
trial in admiralty proceedings, since there is no policy reason for the exception.
The statute has a curious history.11 At the time of its passage, it was the belief
of Congress that admiralty jurisdiction was limited to tide waters;12 cases arising
on the Great Lakes, therefore, would be cognizable only at common law, and
could not be transferred to the admiralty jurisdiction without carrying over the
right to jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. However, the Supreme Court later held that admiralty jurisdiction extended to lakes and navigable waters;13 hence, the cases provided for by the statute were already within
the admiralty jurisdiction and so the provision for jury trial was unnecessary to
make the statute constitutional. Despite subsequent revisions of the Judicial
Code, this provision for jury trial in these limited cases has been retained.14
A seaman seeking a jury trial of his claim for maintenance and cure has
other means of securing it. Under the saving clause of the Judiciary Act, the
seaman may bring his action at law in a state court with a trial by jury,15 or he
may enforce his claim on the law side of the federal district court if there is
diversity of citizenship and the minimum jurisdictional amount of $3,000.16
Recently two other theories for a law action in the federal court have been
developed and both are supported by some authority. One is the theory of
pendent jurisdiction.17 When a seaman brings a negligence action under the
Jones Act at law, as he is permitted to do, he may couple with it a count for
8 Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., note 3 supra; Cheng v. Ellerman Lines, (D.C.
N.Y. 1926) 1926 A.M.C. 1038.
9 Dryden v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., (7th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 291.
10 Romer v. American Export Lines, Inc., llO N.Y.S. (2d) 400 (1952).
11 The history of the act may be found in Gillet v. Pierce, (D.C. Mich. 1875) IO
Fed. Cas. 388, No. 5,437.
12 The Genesee Chief, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 443 (1851), points out that this was the
accepted English view at the time the Constitution was adopted.
1s The Eagle, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 15 (1868).
14 The current form of the provision appears in the Act of June 25, 1948. It reads:
"In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating to any matter of contract or
tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of twenty tons or upward, enrolled and licensed
for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of commerce and navigation between
places in different states upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes, the
trial of all issues of fact shall be by jury if either party demands it." 28 U .S.C. (Supp.
V, 1952) §1873.
15 Pacific Steamship Co. v. Peterson, note 3 supra.
10 4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY, 6th ed., §612 (1941).
17 Under this theory when a federal court has acquired jurisdiction of a cause of action
by reason of a federal question, it may decide all questions raised in the case even though
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maintenance and cure, if the facts supporting the count for maintenance and
cure and the one for negligence are substantially the same. 18 The justification
for such a procedure is practical rather than theoretical, since it may result in
a saving of time, expense, and double litigation. The other theory is set forth
in Doucette v. Vincent, 19 where it was held that a claim for maintenance and
cure raises a federal question within the meaning of section 1331 of the Judicial
Code granting jurisdiction to the federal district courts where the matter in
controversy exceeds $3,000 "and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." The general maritime law was incorporated into the
Constitution by the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal
courts. Under the doctrine laid down in Southern Pacific v. Jensen,20 when a
suit is brought in state court by virtue of the saving clause, the substantive right
of the parties must be determined by the federal maritime law. The conclusion
reached in Doucette v. Vincent from these principles was that a case brought
by virtue of the saving clause is a case "arising under the Constitution." In the
Third Circuit, however, it has been held that the federal question raised in a
claim for maintenance and cure is not sufficient to ground original jurisdiction
in the district courts.21 It does seem somewhat far-fetched to say that all rights
under the general admiralty law are constitutional rights merely because the
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts is an implied adoption of
the general maritime law. The extension of federal question jurisdiction to
admiralty matters would provide plaintiffs a means of coupling the advantages
of the federal court system with trial by jury in those cases where diversity is
lacking. Whether or not the Supreme Court will see fit to complicate the field
of seamen's rights and remedies further by approving this theory remains to be
seen. 22
Richard B. Barnett, S.Ed..

the federal question is decided adversely to the party raising it, and the case is ultimately
decided on non-federal grounds. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586 (1933).
18 Nolan v. General Seafoods Corp., (1st Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 515; Stevens v.
R. O'Brien & Co., Ost Cir. 1933) 62 F. (2d) 632; Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co.
v. Porter, (1st Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 827; Hern v. Moran Towing & Transportation
Co., (2d Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 900. One judge who has followed this practice says that
the results have been satisfactory but expresses doubt as to whether in theory it was permissible. "Yet, unless the theory of pendent jurisdiction be expanded, it seems to me that
all of us have acted erroneously. • • • At any rate, as at present advised I cannot see that
what we have done has ever been explicitly approved by the Supreme Court of the United
States." McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 888 at
892.
10 (1st Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 834.
20244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524 (1917).
21 Jordine v. Walling, (3d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 662.
22 This theory is fully discussed in a note at 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 315 (1952).

